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DESIGN LITIGATION AND THE
STATE OF THE ART: TERMINOLOGY, PRACTICE
AND REFORM
EDWARD T. O'DONNELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
U NLESS TRIAL and appellate judges enforce the limitations on the de-
signer's liability which are embodied in the concept of the "state of
the art," jurors may impose the standards which prevail at the time of trial
on work which was done at an earlier time or they may expect the product
to be perfect. These risks are particularly acute in a period such as the present,
in which governmental standards and public expectations of safety both
grow more demanding each year.
The character of the critical evidence in product litigation presents an
additional, related danger. The opinion testimony of the professional, special-
ized witness probably is indispensable if judge and jurors are to understand
the technical points at issue, but by its very nature that testimony should
inspire a degree of skepticism. Too often, however, the prestige of the witness
and the impressiveness of his unfamiliar jargon overawe laymen and obscure
the fact that he has never tested the device which he argues would have pre-
vented the accident.
We suggest that rather than ignore these problems, or bemoan them
ineffectually, the judiciary should accept the fact that the decision to venture
into the area of scientific and technological controversy' carries with it a
duty to reconcile the law with the essentials of the scientific method. Some
courts already have begun to do so. For instance, suggestions that the manu-
facturer's obligation to design a safe product necessarily must be limited
by the state of the art are common in negligence, warranty and strict liability
*Senior attorney, Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Michigan; B.A., LL.B., Harvard University;
LL.M., New York University; Member, Michigan bar, New Jersey bar. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Ford Motor Co. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to Donald Breen, Thomas Grubba, Robert Lorente
and Marjorie Weiss of the Michigan bar for their contributions of legal research and
analysis and to Thomas Tiede for his guidance on engineering and scientific questions.
One critic has argued that the very nature of the choices which a manufacturer must make
are such that design controversies are no more suited to resolution in a lawsuit than are
political questions or other matters which the courts traditionally have shunned. Henderson,
Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication,
73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973). [hereinafter cited as Limits of Adjudication]. We agree.
Unfortunately, most courts do not. Hence this article will discuss a few of the problems
that the courts encounter when they venture into the field. However, this article should not
be considered an endorsement of the judicial adventure.
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decisions alike.2 Unfortunately these statements usually are dicta rather than
holdings. Worse, the authors of the opinions seldom explore the ramifica-
tions of their remarks or even define their terms.
There also is a more fundamental problem. In spite of their vagueness,
most appellate pronouncements on the subject are reasonable in principle;
and trial judges may well think they are following this moderate approach
if they speak of the importance of practicality, cost and marketability. But
many unwittingly reverse the burden of proof and adopt a more radical
approach in practice, if not in theory, by permitting the verbal ritual-
unsupported statements of opinion by paid partisans-to take the place of
evidence concerning these practical limitations. It is understandable that
courts are reluctant to involve themselves more deeply in unfamiliar and time
consuming technical matters. Yet the application of legal principles to tech-
nology is the essence of product litigation: the issues are difficult and impor-
tant precisely because they arise at the uneasy border between engineering,
law and public policy. The judge who attempts to separate those elements
artificially may distort both legal and scientific principles and upset the
balance among competing policy goals as well.
One reason for the unsatisfying superficiality of the law in this area
may be that the issues seem deceptively simple when they are isolated from
the evidentiary problems of an actual case. It is one thing to discuss these
matters in the abstract, but quite another for court and jury to apply the
apparently straightforward formulae to the technical, economic and social
decisions which the manufacturer faced during the design process.
Consider for instance, a hypothetical case3 in which a defendant
designed and built an automobile in 1972. Three years later, the rear of
the vehicle was demolished by a far larger car which struck it at high
speed. The driver, who was not wearing his seat belt, was thrown forward
and seriously injured. At trial in 1978, his expert, a former aeronautical
2 See Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612, 617, rehearing denied, 531 F.2d 279
(5th Cir. 1976); Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1973)
(comparative designs of similar and competitive machines are relevant to proof of defective
design); Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Co., 401 F.2d 549, 557 (8th Cir. 1968) ("Standards
of design and manufacturing skill must be consonant with the state of the art...");
Holmgren v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 910, 917 (D.N.D. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1975); Cardullo v. General Motors Corp., 378 F. Supp.
890, 893 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1975); Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So.
2d 40, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516,
519 (Tenn. 1973).
s This hypothetical is a composite of aspects of several cases involving different technical
issues. We have edited and "fictionalized" the testimony in the interest of clarity and in
deference to the fact that some of the cases are still being litigated. Accordingly, none of
these statements should be considered to be either an admission or a claim by any actual
manufacturer, plaintiff or individual expert or as a dissertation on the engineering problems
involved in the "30 G" seat.
[Vol. 11:4
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss4/3
SYMPOSIUM: STATE OF THE ART
engineer now self-employed as a consultant on product safety, testifies
that the design of the first vehicle was defective because the seat flexed when
struck from behind. He says that this instantaneous back and forth motion
catapulted the victim forward much as an ejection seat might, a phrase
which he repeats for the jury's benefit.
The expert goes on to assert that the defendant could have eliminated
the risk of such an accident if it had used a "30 G seat."" That design
employs titanium and costly high-alloy steels, as well as a great deal of
bracing, to achieve a degree of strength and rigidity far beyond that of
the conventional seat. Its use has been proposed for use in aircraft from
time to time; for instance, an article in the proceedings of the University
of New Hampshire School of Design described the general approach in
1965. He concludes by stating his opinion that the 30 G design would
have been technically feasible and produceable at reasonable cost in 1972
so that it was "within the state of the art."
Under cross-examination, the expert concedes that 30 G seats never
have been mass-produced and, in fact, never have been used in any auto-
mobile. A few experimental high-performance aircraft did incorporate the
design in the late 1960's and early 1970's but since none of the planes
crashed, the seat's ability to protect the occupant in such an event never
has been demonstrated. In addition, the expert never has personally con-
ducted any tests on the seat and he knows of no statistics which would
either prove or disprove the theory that it was safer than the conventional
design. Nevertheless, he refuses to modify his opinion that the conventional
seat should not have flexed under the circumstances of the collision and
that the alternative approach he discussed was within the state of the art.
In rebuttal, the defense experts point out that while the 30 G seat
might reduce the dangers of flexing under certain circumstances, the nature
of the design would increase other risks. For instance, the unusual rigidity
would protect the occupant who was fully braced in anticipation of a colli-
sion but it might produce more severe whiplash injuries if he did not expect
the collision and was leaning forward or slouched, rather than braced-
and the latter circumstances are at least as likely to occur as the former.
Furthermore, in order to achieve rigidity, the 30 G design eliminates the
normal hinges between the back and the seat cushion. As a result, every
time a person had to get in or out of the rear seat area, he or she would
have to lift the entire front seat up and push it forward. In the opinion of
4 The objective was to produce a seat which would protect the occupant up to "30 G's,"
i.e., thirty times the normal force of gravity. This level was chosen because it was thought
to be the highest which the human body could withstand under any circumstances.
Spring, 19781
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the defense experts, this is a significant inconvenience. More important,
this aspect of the design could create a hazard; a rear seat occupant who
had less than normal strength, e.g., a child or an elderly person, might not
be able to get out of the car quickly in the event of an emergency such as
a fire. The extra bracing at the sides of the seat also makes it awkward for
the occupant of the 30 G seat itself to get in and out; that problem is exacer-
bated by the necessity for additional padding to cover the braces; and the
bulk and weight of the padding in turn diminish the usable space within the
vehicle.
The defense experts say it is their conclusion that the size and com-
plexity of the special seat would mean a car with the dimensions of the
defendant's product could only carry two occupants unless it had four doors.
Thus, a four-door sedan could be built or, theoretically, a two-seat sports
car (which the manufacturer in fact does not believe could be sold in large
enough quantities to be profitable). But neither a two-door sedan nor a
"hatchback" would be practical; and if those popular models were removed
from the line, the vehicle could only have been sold in significantly smaller
quantities, which would increase its unit price. They add that various auto-
mobile manufacturers have experimented with seats based on the concept
from time to time, but it has not been perfected, and using it would
have added hundreds of dollars to the cost of the defendant's vehicle which
was designed to be as simple and lightweight as possible in order to compete
in the low price market.
It is undisputed that in 1972 no governmental standard required that
passenger car seats equal the performance of the 30 G model. Indeed, the
standards which were effective permitted seats to flex as much or more than
did those in the defendant's car.
On appeal, the issue is whether the opinion of the plaintiff's expert
concerning the state of the art is sufficient to support the verdict in spite of
the concessions he made under cross-examination and the testimony of the
defendant's experts. The appellate court's task will be complicated by the
fact that while appellant and appellee both use the term, they may have
significantly different ideas as to its significance.
II. THE TERM "STATE OF THE ART" AND SOME OF ITS MEANINGS
Although the expression originated in scientific circles, an informal
survey suggests that engineers and designers understand "the state of the art"
to mean approximately what the laymen would gather from the dictionary
definition: "contemporaneous practical skill in performance exercised by
[Vol. 11:4
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the designers of products."5 In any event, the dictionary definition seems as
acceptable a starting point for discussion as any,' provided that those who
use the phrase realize that it may have secondary meanings and nuances
for lawyers.
A. The Opposing Extremes
The defense bar occasionally uses "the state of the art" as a shorthand
reference to the general idea that the custom which prevails in an industry
sets the standard for due care and the "reasonably safe" product. In the
remote past, this was thought to mean that if the evidence showed that the
manufacturer used the approach which all or the majority of its competitors
used, it could not be liable. Few are hardy enough to argue that position
today except in the instance in which industry practice is uniform because
of governmental regulation or where the plaintiff claims punitive damages
from a defendant whose conduct conformed to prevailing trade practice."
It is a cliche that the standards prevailing in an entire industry can be too
low. There is, however, considerable support for the more limited argument
that one who claims that an entire industry has been negligent should have
to satisfy a rigorous standard of proof and that compliance with the normal
practice of the industry should create a strong presumption in the defendant's
favor.'
5 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 49 (1963), quoted in Raleigh, The
'State of the Art' in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old 'Defense,' 4 OHIo N. L. REV.
249, 258 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Raleigh].
6 See Raleigh, supra note 5, at 258.
7 See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., No. CA 3-76-1204-6 (N.D. Tex. April 21, 1978).
In Maxey, a $10,000,000 punitive damage award was set aside because the truck design was
common to the entire industry and was not attacked by a regulatory agency. The court held
that these factors far outweighed the defendant's failure to test or use the supposedly
superior alternate design.
The conventional assumption as to the limited nature of the defense has been challenged
recently. See Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV.
643, 650-51 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Epstein], where the author argues that industry
practice is often the only workable standard and cites, by analogy, the fact that conformity
to the professional norm has long been accepted as an absolute defense in medical
malpractice suits.
s See McCung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 240
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); Raleigh, supra note 5.
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the rare situation in which the
"state of the art" is offered as an affirmative defense and the more common and important
situation-to which we devote most of our attention in this article-in which the concept
serves as one of the limits of "defect" or "due care." In the former, the product is "defective"
for some valid reason, and the defense is only that other products are made in the same
way, i.e., equally defective. It is not surprising that modern courts are not receptive to this
defense. In the latter situation, an accident has occurred and the issue is whether the product
involved was defective or whether the manufacturer failed to exercise due care. The question
of what others have done is directly relevant to the basic question of what reasonably could
have been done. As we shall see, the courts give far more respect to the suggestion that
practicality, cost and other relevant factors be considered than they give to the simple
suggestion that conformity is a defense.
Spring, 19781
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The most extreme interpretation of the phrase from the opposite
point of view, that of the plaintiffs' bar, holds that when the judge and jury
set the required level of performance, they can take into account all of the
thinking of the most advanced practitioners of the basic sciences in addition
to the principles and techniques recognized in the industry or in compar-
able fields, i.e., they are free to decide that anything a scientist might think
was possible in theory or under laboratory conditions was part of the state
of the art, regardless of practicality in engineering or business terms.'
This schematic view is, of course, misleadingly simple. Many of the con-
stituent elements of each approach themselves present problems of definition.
Is the passenger automobile business comparable, for this purpose, to the
production of trucks, or racing cars, or aircraft?1" And when is technology
"known"? Does the state of the art include all that the journeyman would
be expected to know or does it also extend to leading professional articles
or to even obscure monographs reposing in university libraries? 1 More-
over, the majority of cases fall between the two extremes. Most courts
have rejected the defense view over the years, at least in its extreme
manifestation, and while lawyers often resort to the radical plaintiff's view
in argument, we are not aware of any appellate decision which explicitly
adopts it. As so often happens in the law, precedent instead tends to cluster
around an ill-defined midpoint with an air of "practicality" which is reassuring
but perhaps deceptive.
1 2
9 See Raleigh, supra note 5, at 253-55.
In addition, some lawyers and commentators speak of a requirement that the defendant's
product be "current" with the state of the art. See, e.g., Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc.,
349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972). The effect of this requirement is to make the phrase
"state of the art" synonomous with "due care." Apparently a product may be "current"
in the sense that it is of "good average quality" in terms of U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b) without
being the ultimate in safety. Note that there is also a colloquial usage in advertising by
which a product is said to be "state of the art," which means that it is the best available.
10 It may be more than a coincidence that the expert who testifies on behalf of a plaintiff
against an automobile company tends to have academic credentials and work experience
in aeronautical engineering. Perhaps they are so critical because the basic factors of cost,
weight and ease of maintenance have a relationship in aircraft far different from that in an
automobile. A more practical explanation, of course, is that employment has declined in
the aircraft industry. Unable to find work in their own field, a number of engineers have
found it highly profitable to set themselves up as experts on automobile design.
-1For instance, Raleigh points out that the basic scientific principles which led to the
development of radar in the 1930's were known to physicists as early as 1866. Raleigh,
supra note 5, at 255.
12 To provide a frame of reference, the author has discussed the secondary meanings of the
term which are most representative of the thinking of lawyers and judges. But a caveat
is necessary. Because this article sets forth two contrasting extremes and a middle view,
the reader may assume that the views we outline schematically as those of the "defendant"
and the "plaintiff" are equally radical, albeit in opposite directions, and that the middle view
is the path of wisdom. In reality, the author believes that there is a great deal to be said
for the "defense" view although it is largely beyond the scope of this article and, on the
other hand, that the plaintiff's view has little merit. Indeed, the latter may seem, at first
[Vol. 11:4
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B. The Phrase as it Has Been Used by Most Courts
This consensus 3 has two basic elements. The first is historical per-
spective. A recent case, Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.," illustrates the
point well. The relatives of passengers who were killed when an airliner
crashed in 1970 sued Martin, the manufacturer, in strict liability. The plane
was built in 1952. The theory of liability derived from the automobile
"crashworthiness" cases:' 5 the allegation was not that any defect in the
plane caused it to go down, but that the seats broke loose and burned when
it did crash. When the defendant moved for summary judgment, the plain-
tiffs relied on an affidavit by an aircraft accident investigator that seats
which were in common use in 1970 would have remained in place, reduc-
ing the hazard of fire in this "otherwise survivable" accident. Both the trial
judge and the circuit court flatly rejected that suggestion and held that the
manufacturer could not be liable simply because superior seats existed
eighteen years after it had designed and sold its product. Judge Breitenstein
found it self-evident that the design should not be measured by the standards
of a later period in which advances in technology might have made possible
or even commonplace things which could not have been done by the most
able designer at the earlier time: "A consumer would not expect a Model
T to have the safety features which are incorporated in automobiles today."'"
glance, to be nothing more than a "straw man." Unfortunately, weak as it is, this type of
argument often is given credence at the trial court level. More importantly, many courts
purport to follow the middle course, but refuse to enforce meaningful requirements of proof.
Whether or not they realize it, they are adopting the plaintiff's view in practice, even
though they rejected it in theory. Thus it is important that the reader grasp the nature of
the plaintiff's view even though he may never see it set forth explicitly.
1"See, e.g., Verson Allsteel Press Co. v. Garner, 547 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Ark. 1977) ("usage
cannot make a practice which is inherently dangerous reasonably safe"); Horn v. General
Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976); Badorek v.
General Motors Corp., 12 Cal. App. 3d 447, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970); Gilbert v. Stone
City Constr. Co., 357 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Ind. App. 1976); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg.,
Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Ky. 1973); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d
497, 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245,
251, 217 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1975).
14 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
15 See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). Note that the doc-
trine is not universally accepted. See Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
16 544 F.2d at 447. Other courts have used even more descriptive language to express the
same idea. E.g., Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187, 192 (E.D. La. 1969)
("Monday morning quarterback"). See also Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App.
3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1973), where the court said: "Strict liability for de-
ficient design.., is premised on a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous
for its intended use, and in turn, the unreasonableness of the danger must necessarily be
derived from the state of the art at the time of design."
The point may seem a mere truism that is too obvious to merit discussion. Unfortunately,
it is not. The California Supreme Court has recently stated in a products liability case that
the jury was free to evaluate a design in the light of "hindsight." Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co.,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239, 573 P.2d 443, 457 (1978).
Spring, 1978]
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The "state of the art", however, has a second aspect, equally important
but far less clear-cut. The phrase serves as part of the qualitative standard
as well as a reference to the time dimension; the question is not merely when
an alternative approach was feasible, but whether there ever was a viable
alternative at all. This aspect of the concept is far more diffuse and difficult
to define than the time dimension, but a number of opinions offer significant
insights. For example, in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,"7 the Eighth Cir-
cuit emphasized the distinction between the possible-meaning that which
could be done using existing technology, at least if a wholly dispropor-
tionate share of available resources were devoted to the problem-and that
which is practical and useful:
[U]nder the present state of the art an automobile manufacturer is under
no duty to design an accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle or even one
that floats on water, but such manufacturer is under a duty to use
reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user
to an unreasonable risk of injury....11
Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 9 placed greater emphasis on the
necessities that the alternative be perfected and that the novel design
which improves safety under some circumstances not be used as a measure
if it also would make the product more dangerous under other circumstances
or interfere unduly with its ability to function. In that case, the plaintiff fell
from a moving snowmobile. His foot was injured when it caught in a metal
track. At the trial of his negligence and warranty claims, his counsel argued
that a rubber track would not have injured the boy as severely and that such
tracks and other modifications were within the state of the art in 1966.20
The trial judge, sitting without a jury, ruled in favor of defendants. The
"crashworthiness" principle applied, he held, but even Larsen v. General
Motors had to be subject to limitations: "To refuse to consider the 'state
of the art' as the key to the operational aspects of a snowmobile would be
to hold the manufacturer liable for merely marketing a functional product
-in effect placing absolute liability upon such manufacturer."'"
His recognition of the fact that the product must be functional as well
as safe also led Judge Benson to place considerable emphasis upon the
testimony for the defense that the use of more shielding around the track -
one approach urged by the plaintiff's expert - would not have been practical.
The idea was a simple one which obviously was "known" at the time the
17 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
I1 d. at 502.
19 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972). In this case both the design and accident occurred in
1966.
20 Id. at 765.
21 Id. at 764-65,
[Vol. 11:4
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design was done, but it would have tended to make the snowmobile bog
down excessively in normal snow conditions.
Going a step further, the same opinion indicated that even if an alter-
native approach were workable, the defendant would not necessarily have
a duty to adopt it. There was testimony that some manufacturers had in-
stalled hand holds on their snowmobiles but that Arctic had not. The judge,
however, rejected this as a basis for liability because of the defense expert's
testimony that hand holds increase the risk that a rider who is thrown will
be entangled in the machine and that flexible handles, which did eliminate
that danger, had not been available at the earlier time when the snowmobile
was designed.22
The character of the proof was even more important in Maxted v.
Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 3 a strict liability suit brought by the driver of
a logging tractor-trailer who was injured when the vehicle "jack-knifed" and
rolled over. The plaintiff's expert criticized the design on several grounds,
the most important being the absence of a device which would have en-
abled the operator to jettison the trailer if it began to tip. During discovery
the expert conceded that no such device had been used on any truck and
that he had developed the idea himself when he was commissioned by the
plaintiff's counsel years after the actual vehicle had been designed. But
when the defendant moved for summary judgment the expert submitted an
affidavit asserting that the "jettisoner" would have been "well within the
state of the art" at the time the truck was designed. The Wyoming Supreme
Court nevertheless affirmed the entry of summary judgment as to this part
of the case," reasoning that the plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence
that the proposed "safer" design would work at all, much less that it had
been perfected five years earlier.
C. A Synthesis of the Prevailing View
The cases which we have discussed thus far, as well as other characteris-
tic design litigation decisions, concentrate upon a few of the circumstances
of an individual accident and do not offer a general synthesis. Nevertheless,
they involve a few relatively straightforward ideas, and it is possible to
discern the rough outline of the doctrine.
The state of the art begins with the question of bare technological
possibility. The defendant cannot be penalized for not doing that which no
22 Id. at 765-66.
23527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974).
Si41d. at 836. For cases expressing similar views, see Bunn v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 415
F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 224
(1977); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Ore. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978).
Spring, 1978]
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one could do.2" But there clearly are other considerations as well. In Lolie
v. Ohio Brass Co." the Seventh Circuit held that even under strict liability, the
plaintiff's burden of proof in design defect cases includes "proof that, inter
alia: (1) the product as designed is incapable of preventing the injury
complained of; (2) there existed an alternative design which would have
prevented the injury; and (3) in terms of cost, practicality and technological
possibility, the alternative design was feasible."2 This necessarily must be so
if the constant assurances in the product liability reports that the manu-
facturer's liability is not that of an insurer 8 are to mean anything. Moreover,
the alternative technique or device on which the proof of design defect
depends must be "practical" in the relevant context, i.e., it must be usable in
the mass-produced product in question or, at the least, in another product
which is legitimately comparable to it. The fact that it could work well in a
different product with a different purpose or a more sophisticated operator
proves nothing. 9
The costs of producing a product using the alternative design, and of
research and development with the objective of increasing safety, also im-
pose practical constraints:
Price is also a factor to be considered, for, if a change in design would
appreciably add to cost, add little to safety, and take an article out of
the price range of the market to which it was intended to appeal, it
may be "unreasonable" as well as "impractical" for the Courts to re-
quire the manufacturer to adopt such change.... [A] Cadillac may be
expected to include more in the way of both conveniences and "crash-
worthiness" than the economy car.3"
By the same reasoning, marketability is also a legitimate factor. A manu-
facturer must build a safe product, but it also has to sell the device to the
general public. Thus it cannot dismiss aesthetics and subjective consumer
preferences any more than it can ignore cost.
2 5 ee, e.g., Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972). See also
Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971), discussed infra note 85
and accompanying text.
26 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974).
27 Id. at 744.
28 Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 949
(1975); Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549, 557 (8th Cir. 1968); Larsen
v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968); Balido v. Improved Mach.,
Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1973); Center Chemical Co. v.
Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 869, 218 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1975); Mullen v. General Motors Corp., 32
Ill. App. 3d 122, 129, 336 N.E.2d 338, 344 (1975); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514
S.W.2d 497, 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216
Va. 245, 251, 217 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1975).
29 See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
3OId. at 1072-73. See also Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971).
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Finally, while the existence of an alternative design is a necessary con-
dition to liability, it is not sufficient in and of itself. An alternative technique
may be within the state of the art, but that does not mean a manufacturer
who does not use it necessarily is negligent or its product defective.81 The
alternative, while permissible, may not be as safe as the original design
when its performance under a variety of conditions is taken into account.
For example, in Korli v. Ford,"' the plaintiff had introduced expert opinion
testimony that rear-hinged automobile doors were more dangerous than
front-hinged doors in the circumstances of that particular accident; but
the appellate court held that testimony to have been neutralized by other
evidence which showed that the front-hinged door would have been more
dangerous in the event of fire and in other common situations. Accordingly,
it entered judgment in the defendant's favor. Similarly, in Arctic Cat the
court placed considerable emphasis on testimony that although rubber tracks
might have done less damage to the boy's foot when it became entangled in
the snowmobile, that type of track also was more likely to break and the
greater risk of a broken track in turn increased the danger that the snow-
mobile's operator might be stranded in the wilderness."3
Moreover, even proof that an alternative product is safer in some or
all respects would not compel the conclusion that competing products were
defective or negligently made. The courts have emphasized again and again
that the manufacturer does not have any duty to produce "the ultimate in
31 For example, in Weakley v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975), the
defendants and third-party plaintiffs asserted a claim against a manufacturer of plant equip-
ment and showed that an alternative design had been available which would have prevented
the accident which caused the plaintiff's injuries. Nevertheless, the court affirmed a verdict
for the manufacturer, stating: "It is one thing to show that the defendant might have
designed a safer product: quite another to show that the product he did design was un-
reasonably dangerous." 515 F.2d at 1267. Similarly, in McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333
F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971), afl'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940
(1973), the plaintiff demonstrated that there were other steering wheel designs which would
not have caused his injury. The trial court in McClung still granted a summary judgment
for the defendant, stating:
To be actionable... the vehicle, alleged to have been of a design that makes it unfit
for its intended use, must have been of such design and structure as was at variance
with, or contrary to, the accepted body of scientific knowledge possessed by the average
mechanical or structural engineering personnel in the profession having to do with the
manufacture of subject vehicle.
333 F. Supp. at 21. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 96, at 645 (4th
ed. 1971). See also Cardullo v. General Motors Corp., 378 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
afl'd, 511 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1975); Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187, 192
(E.D. La. 1969); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973); Henderson
v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
12 69 Cal. App. 3d 115, 137 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1977).
33 Olson v. Artic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.D. 1972). This would sub-
ject the rider to risks such as frost bite, wild animals, etc.
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safety"3 and, were there no such precedent, common sense would require
some such limitation on liability. Otherwise every manufacturer but one
would be liable for failing to produce a product as safe as that which the
plaintiff chose to single out as the "best" in the industry;" and even that
paragon could expect that another plaintiff would soon charge that some
other aspect of his product was not as safe as that of a competitor."
These principles, of course, are but indicators of the most general sort,
not a set of precise guidelines. Moreover, they often overlap. If one were
devising a vocabulary for future design litigation, without regard to what
has occurred in the past, the strongest single argument for the extreme plain-
tiff's interpretation might be that reader and commentator would not have
to deal with an awkward bundle of interrelated considerations if the "state
of the art" consisted of a single factor such as technological possibility. But
desirable as such a clarification might have been when the courts first began
to grapple with design controversies, it would not be an accurate statement
of the precedent which in fact did develop.
Moreover, a "single factor" definition might well be unworkable and
misleading in the very cases which would be most important to the public.
In theoretical work, or even in the design of highly sophisticated research
vehicles, the emphasis is upon the discovery of new principles, and matters
such as cost, ease of manufacture and suitability for use by relatively un-
34 Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 93 (Tex. 1974). See also Weakley v.
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant not obliged to
design the safest possible product); Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966) (manufacturer is under no duty to make his
product accident-proof or foolproof); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307,
310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 20, 484
P.2d 47, 61 (1971); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Ky. 1973);
Foster v. Marshall, 341 So. 2d 1354, 1361 (La. App. 1977) (manufacturer is not ex-
pected to design its products with components that never wear out); Seward v. Natural
Gas Co., 8 N.J. 45, 51, 83 A.2d 716, 719 (1951) (there is no duty for the manufacturer
"to use the ultimate in scientifically perfect equipment or appliances with the hope that
foolhardy action by human beings would be prevented").
.' In fact, this is exactly what does go on even though this is not expressed by the courts
or by the commentators. Time and time again, a plaintiff charges that a manufacturer should
be liable because it did not use the technique which one of its competitors used. Even though
the plaintiff and the court dutifully say that the manufacturer is not held to produce the
ultimate in safety, they treat the assertion that the competitor's product is "safer" as a suffi-
cient basis for liability. This is a contradiction in terms unless one assumes that the com-
petitor's approach is actually safer, and accepts the premise that one competitor's safer
approach is a fair standard to use in judgment of the defendant's approach. If there is a
practical difference between this and holding the manufacturer to a duty of producing a prod-
uct as safe as any other offered by anyone else in the world--"the ultimate"-it has not
yet been fully explained.
2 E.g., some manufacturers often are attacked for placing the gasoline tank in the rear
where it is said to be vulnerable to a rear-end collision; while others are attacked for placing
it in the front where it is said to be vulnerable to a front-end collision.
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skilled operators in a variety of environments are properly eliminated from
consideration. But these latter factors are of the essence when a consumer
product is designed.37
Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to pretend that the courts have
used the term in a truly coherent manner. When one reads an opinion in a
design controversy, it often is a fair question just what the reference to the
"state of the art" means. All that can be said with any confidence is that
the phrase embodies something more than "possibility" in purely technologi-
cal terms and something less than all of the factors which must be considered
on the issue of liability. In the main, this confusion probably has not been
harmful. Semantic niceties aside, it is a hopeful sign that the phrase is part
of the background of product litigation. Even if they do not always articulate
the point clearly, the majority of trial lawyers and judges apparently appreci-
ate the fact that matters such as technical feasibility, cost and ease of main-
tenance impose limitations on a manufacturer no matter how devoted to
safety its designers may be.38 Unfortunately, however, a few courts have
suggested that the state of the art can be ignored in strict liability cases.
III. THE MINORITY VIEW THAT THE STATE OF THE ART
Is NOT RELEVANT To STRICT LIABILITY
A. A Narrow Reading of the California and Illinois Precedent
There are cases in two important jurisdictions which, it is usually as-
sumed, hold that the state of the art cannot be given any consideration in a
strict liability case. If that reading is correct, these cases represent a change
in the nature of design litigation. But when the sweeping assertions
are read closely and in context, there seems to be at least a possibility
that the vagueness of the prevailing terminology has misled the courts
into saying far more than they intended. For example, Horn v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. 9 was a strict liability suit brought by a woman who was
injured when her car hit a concrete abutment. As Mrs. Horn was strug-
gling to avoid the crash, her hand brushed across the horn cap located
in the center of the steering wheel. It flew off; when she was thrown forward
by the impact of the collision, her face hit three sharp retaining prongs which
had been shielded while the cap was in position. In upholding a verdict
for the plaintiff, the California Supreme Court said that there was no neces-
37 Purely theoretical research which ignores the practical factors may seem totally unrelated
to the normal products liability suit, but plaintiffs sometimes argue that it should be con-
trolling. For instance in Foster v. Ford Motor Co., No. 77-2352 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1977),
appeal docketed, No. C.A. 75-61 (5th Cir. Aug. 16. 1977), an engineer from NASA success-
fully argued that the company should have used the technology of rocket ships on automobiles
and even tractors.
31 See cases cited note 30 supra.
39 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976).
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sity that she prove the design of the Chevrolet horn cap fell short of the
prevailing state of the art in the industry;4" and, in the process, the court
generalized that the "state of the art" is not a limitation on strict liability
for design defects. The opinion, however, also reveals that a defense expert
had admitted that the horn cap could have been screwed into place, as the
plaintiff's expert argued it should have been, and that the increased cost,
if any, would not have been significant." Thus the defendant's own witness
had conceded two of the more basic elements of any design defect claim:
(1) a safer alternative design was technically feasible and (2) it could
have been used without an unreasonable cost penalty. 2 Moreover, there
was no question of technological advance comparable to that which is
usually involved in cases in which the doctrine of the state of the art plays
a role.4
This suggests that beneath the luxuriant dicta the court only held that
the fact other automobile manufacturers used prongs instead of screws to
solve the relatively simple problem of fastening a horn cap to a steering
column was not a defense once the defendant's expert conceded that the
latter technique was practical. This, in turn, would amount to nothing more
than the familiar rule that conformity to industry practice is not an absolute
defense-a holding far less revolutionary than one which abolished the
concept of the state of the art altogether.
The Illinois Supreme Court dealt with a more substantial technical
issue in Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital," but that opinion
also does not necessarily require the sweeping interpretation which it has
been given. The plaintiff claimed that she had contracted serum hepatitis
from a blood transfusion. The court held that the allegation stated a valid
cause of action even though it was undisputed that a small percentage of
those who receive blood transfusions will contract hepatitis in spite of every
precaution which any hospital could use to eliminate that risk.4 The state
of medical technology was no defense, the court wrote, because to permit
a defendant to escape liability simply because it had been as careful as
possible would obliterate the distinction between negligence and strict
liability."
40 Id. at 367, 551 P.2d at 402, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
"4 Id. at 367, 551 P.2d at 401-02, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82.
42 See note 27 supra.
43See cases cited in notes 23 and 24 supra.
44 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
451d. at 452-53, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
46 Id. at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902. The court stated:
To allow a defense to strict liability on the ground that there is no way, either practical
[Vol. 11:4
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Here again, close reading of the text raises a question as to the extent
to which the court intended its statements to alter fundamental law.4 7 The
plaintiff had appealed from a judgment on the pleadings, a fact which Judge
Culbertson emphasized when he explained why the transaction should be
deemed a sale rather than a service. Moreover, he referred to the same pro-
cedural point when he ruled that the hospital could not rely on Comment
k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts."9 That provision
prohibits liability for the sale of drugs and other products which by their
very nature are incapable of being made safe-language which on its face
would seem to apply to blood plasma which cannot be made less dangerous.
The judge, nevertheless, concluded that the "defective" nature of the
plasma distinguished it from hydrophobia serum (rabies vaccine), the
example given in Comment k. The serum, although necessary to the cure
of a terrible disease, is itself likely to produce harmful side effects because
of its very nature, not because it is "defective" or contaminated in any way.
In contrast, the complaint said that the plasma was "defective"-so, he
suggested, it would be "defective" for purposes of appellate review of a
judgment on the pleadings aside from the considerations of policy which
led him to the same result."9
or theoretical, for a defendant to ascertain the existence of impurities in his product
would be to emasculate the doctrine and in a very real sense would signal a retreat to a
negligence theory.
47 Illinois had previously recognized state of the art evidence. See Moren v. Samuel M. Langs-
ton Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759 (1968); Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 I11.
App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956).
48S 47 I11. 2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 903-04.
49 The precise extent to which the procedural context of the case controlled the result is
not clear. That influence cannot be dismissed as negligible, however, because the court's analy-
sis of the policy considerations begs the question. Judge Culbertson did not discuss the
example given in the Restatement, Pasteur vaccine for rabies. Although it is necessary for
the treatment of the terrible disease, the serum itself is likely to produce harmful side effects,
even if it is not "impure" or "defective." Blood plasma, on the other hand, will not cause
hepatitis in the recipient unless it is contaminated with the hepatitis virus. From this premise,
he asserted that "there can be no question" that blood containing hepatitis virus is "de-
fective." But in fact there seems to be an entirely legitimate question as to whether blood
containing hepatitis virus should be deemed "defective" for purposes of strict liability law
in view of the lack of any technology which could eliminate the danger. The distinction
between a product that may cause harm because of an unpredictable reaction in the user
and one that causes harm because of the unavoidable presence of a disease-causing organism
is an artificial one at best and it is unclear why it should dictate the result of the case. Under
the peculiar fact pattern of the blood cases, it can reasonably be said that blood which is
obtained through a careful selection of donors and properly stored is not unreasonably
dangerous. Blood transfusions, like rabies vaccine, are often necessary to preserve life, and
can justifiably be performed even though there is an attendant risk. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment K (1965). But the most important flaw in the court's
opinion was its failure to consider the important policy issue involved. If liability is imposed
without regard to any available technology which could have been employed to make the
product safer, there is nothing a manufacturer or seller can do to avoid it; in effect, absolute
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This approach gave the Illinois Supreme Court a simple way to de-
cide the case. Once one assumes that plasma or any other product is defec-
tive, it follows, in purely verbal terms, that due care would not protect the
manufacturer from liability under section 402A. But the fact that the result
seems to have been influenced by a procedural point as much as by the
court's analysis of the policy factors, should reduce its precedential value.
B. A Critique of the Broader Interpretation of Horn and Cunningham
Ours, or course, is a consciously restrictive reading of these cases. The
majority of lawyers and judges who have considered the matter have thought
that Cunningham and Horn do represent a broad new principle, and that
interpretation would not make the cases wholly unprecedented aberrations."0
That broader interpretation, however, seems to show a lack of perspec-
tive. In order to create an additional distinction between two theories, neg-
ligence and strict liability, the courts apparently are willing to ignore the
necessity that the manufacturer's duty be limited by the reasonable expecta-
tion of the consumer, the very basis for strict liability.5 If, for instance
Mrs. Cunningham knew of the danger of infection from the plasma, how
liability is imposed, and the manufacturer or seller becomes an insurer, despite the many
judicial assertions to the contrary.
Since the potentially far-reaching effect of Cunningham appears not to have been con-
sidered by the court, its weight as precedent may be substantially curtailed in future cases.
Indeed, there is Illinois precedent for recognizing evidence in regard to the state of the art.
See cases cited note 47 supra.
50 The Illinois legislature adopted a statute precluding liability in such transfusion cases. The
Blood Labeling Act, §§ 1-4, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 181-184 (1973). The statute, as
amended, provides an automatic repeal on July 1, 1981. As of 1975, forty-three states had
adopted similar statutes. To the author, this suggests that the public's view of the policy issues
is drastically different from that of the courts. Nevertheless, a number of later Illinois decis-
ions have assumed that Cunningham required them to hold that the state of the art cannot
be an issue in any strict liability case. See Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1973) (applying Illinois law). See also Stanfield v. Medalist
Indus., Inc., 34 111. App. 3d 635, 340 N.E.2d 276 (1975); Matthews v. Stewart Warner Corp.,
20 Ill. App. 3d 70, 314 N.E.2d 683 (1973); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 I11. App.
3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973).
For the most part, these latter cases simply have repeated the Illinois Supreme Court's
dicta without analyzing the question further. Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co. is a representative
example. There a punch press operator lost several fingers when he slipped on an oil smear.
Falling, he grabbed the press's die and, at the same time, inadvertently triggered the foot
pedal which operated the mechanism. The pedal, like those on all comparable machines, was
only partially shielded. Relying on Cunningham, the Court of Appeals said that conformity
to the state of the art was not a defense to a claim against an unreasonably dangerous
product. In the final analysis, the Court in reversing the summary judgment seemed to have
only held that the fact that the technique in question was the same as that used by others
in the industry did not preclude a jury issue. Such a ruling rejects the extreme defense view,
but it does not necessarily reject any or all of the ideas embodied in the more moderate
consensus.
51 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 337 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
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could she, as a reasonable consumer have "expected" the product to be as
"safe" as it would have been if that risk did not exist? 2 Yet the clarification
of the distinction between negligence and strict liability is merely desirable
at most, while consistency with the very basis of the doctrine would seem
to be essential.
Moreover, there is an even more basic question. The desire for doctrinal
elegance is laudable, but is it sufficient to justify the elimination of limita-
tions on design liability as fundamental and intuitively necessary as con-
siderations of cost, practicality and function? Strict liability itself, after all,
is not the product of any such rigorous logic. On the contrary, it evolved
slowly as judges chipped away at defenses and other aspects of the warranty
law, 3 not because they perceived any fallacies or conceptual weaknesses
in warranty doctrine but because they sought to achieve a desirable policy
goal: the protection of the consumer in situations where his lack of experi-
ence or lack of bargaining power placed him at a serious disadvantage. If,
then, the doctrine is not a response to an intellectual imperative but, rather,
an attempt to carry out the most general of policy goals, there is no reason
to sacrifice other considerations of policy-such as fundamental fairness-
to the pretense that strict liability has a profound and sacrosanct theoretical
basis.
Indeed, it seems ironic that the same jurisdiction which expresses its
concern over the lack of meaningful standards in modem product liability
law is one of the leaders in the attempt to eliminate the state of the art as
one such standard-and that it acts in the name of intellectual purity. The
California Court of Appeals has called upon the lower courts to guard
against "extravagant claims of defective design so that the good in product
protection against injuries resulting from abuse and misuse is not drowned
in a sea of unmeritorious demands for payments of the wages of reckless-
ness and folly."' 4 The Supreme Court of the same state, distressed at the
confusion which had developed at the trial level, later set forth a list of
factors which it urged trial judges to include in the jury charges on the nature
of a defect." In principle, the effort at clarification is commendable. Yet,
52 Conversely, if she did not know of the risk, the case might properly be analyzed in terms
of the duty to warn. But anything it said about the state of the art would be even more
clearly dicta.
53 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960). The
California Supreme Court made precisely this point in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978), in the course of holding that the principles of com-
parative negligence apply in strict liability cases.
54 Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579-80 (1974).
55 Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). Among the factors
named by the court were: "the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
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citing Horn, the court discussed matters of cost, feasibility and the like-
precisely those matters which Horn had been thought to have eliminated
from design cases by its statements concerning the state of the art. It remains
to be seen whether the court truly intended to overrule that aspect of Horn.
C. The Incentive Rationale
The apparent inconsistency of the California decisions is but one man-
ifestation of a broader problem. The suggestion that the state of the art is
not a limitation upon the manufacturer's liability makes the law incompre-
hensible to the designer or engineer who finds his work under attack. He
is left with the dispiriting counsel that it does not matter that he complied
with the regulations that the government has imposed upon him56 or that
neither he nor any other engineer knew of any additional steps which would
have made the product safer. His employer is still liable.
To be frank, of course, even the relatively conservative doctrine which
we discussed earlier is more pious exhortation than meaningful standard.
Essentially, all that these cases say is that the designer must attempt to bal-
ance matters such as cost, performance and marketability. Any sensible
designer or layman knows that much without legal advice. It would require
a dozen pages to convey to the general reader the enormity of the gulf
between these generalities and the complex process by which thousands of
skilled technicians spend years on the design and production of a product
such as an automobile. But when a judge says, or seems to say, that these
factors are not even to be taken into consideration, he severs all communica-
tion between himself and the persons whose conduct he is attempting to
regulate. What, after all, are the courts telling us when they announce in
Horn and Cunningham that the state of the art is not relevant-that manu-
facturers must do something which is not possible yet-or useful-or worth
the cost?
Some have sought to rationalize the basic approach of cases like
Horn and Cunnigham by suggesting that the higher the standard to which
an industry is held, the greater the "incentive" it will have to invest in re-
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative
design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product
and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design." 573 P.2d at 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. at 237. Unfortunately, the court also stated that the jury could use "hindsight"
to determine if the design is unsafe and also effectively placed the burden of proof on the
manufacturer. Id. at 237, 239, 573 P.2d at 455, 457. Additional moderating language from
the same court can also be found in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575
P.2d 1162 (1978).
56See, e.g., Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 843, 314 P.2d 130, 134 (1957); Sher-
man v. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d 922, 282 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (1967). 18
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search and development and, accordingly, that the product should not be
judged by the state of the art which prevailed when the manufacturer was
designing it but by that which had evolved by the time of the trial months
or years later." Fortunately, scholars already have suggested the weaknesses
of the economic assumptions upon which those suggestions are based. 8
Thus rather than duplicate these efforts, we will limit ourselves to articu-
lating some additional reasons why the "incentive" argument is unrealistic.
To be fair, it is possible for the law to exert pressure which will require
a manufacturer to spend more money on research and development, and
this, in turn, presumably may "advance" the state of the art in some in-
stances, e.g., exhaust emissions and fuel economy in the automobile industry.
But that can only happen when it is logical for the manufacturer to expect
those expenditures to accomplish something; this might occur in the con-
trolled circumstances of a carefully designed adminstrative program, but
it cannot in common law litigation.
An administrative agency can impose specific requirements which
become effective after those who must meet them have had a reasonable
amount of time to prepare. Consequently, a manufacturer (and ultimately
the purchaser) of the product must bear a great deal of expense, much of
it wasted, but at least it can make an effort to comply with a known standard.
The "incentive" theory assumes that this is also true in litigation, i.e., that
the manufacturer, like the lawyer or the legal commentator, can devote
resources and attention to a single case, or at the most, to a few well-defined
classes of accidents. But, as Professor Henderson has suggested, that premise
in turn depends on a misleading oversimplification of the process of design
and the host of interrelated judgments and compromises which it necessarily
involves. 9
Moreover, a large manufactuter knows that it must expect dozens or
even hundreds of lawsuits each year and that they will be based on a variety
of theories, some legitimate and some not. This means that it cannot con-
centrate its resources on any single problem, or even a few, as it can when the
question is compliance with administrative standards. Worse, once the element
37 See Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 306-07, 296 A.2d 668, 672 (L. Div.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1974), af'd,
66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975). See also Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer
Protection: Doctrine, Function & Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV.
1109, 1371 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Representational Theory]; 41 TENN. L. REV. 357, 364
(1974).
,sSee W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 97, at 650, n.93 (4th ed. 1971).
See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 6.10-6.11 (2d ed. 1977); Epstein, supra
note 7, at 659, and Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects
in Products - An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 943 (1957).
59 Limits of Adjudication, supra note 1, at 1558.
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of time is removed from the equation, the entire concept of the state of the
art is virtually meaningless, and the manufacturer's potential liability, al-
ready formidable, becomes limitless. If one jury can hold against the manu-
facturer on the theory that it should have used technology which did not
exist until the time of trial, there seems to be no particular reason why
another jury could not hold it liable for failing to go even further into the
fourth dimension. Moreover, any jury could impose that liability for any
aspect of the design which might be involved in any accident on the theory
that the manufacturer always could have done more than was feasible and
practical if it had devoted some undefined "additional amount of resources"
to research and development on every conceivable characteristic of its
products. Thus the effective standard would be perfection, whether or not
the courts chose to continue to deny the fact.
Judgments of this sort would not foster safety. Far from being chas-
tened or inspired by the rhetoric of corporate responsibility, manufacturers
logically would begin to think of common law litigation as one of the
random hazards of life against which they cannot protect themselves. This
would not lead them to defy the courts or ignore their duties to the public.
But the lack of coherent judicial standards would leave them no choice but
to act in accordance with their own concepts of practicality and right and
wrong, together with whatever regulations the executive branch and Con-
gress may impose upon them. Such a situation must tend to undermine the
intellectual respectability of the common law and, ultimately, its moral
authority, a consideration which may be more important than the supposed
need to maintain the theoretical difference between negligence and strict
liability in design litigation.
IV. A REQUIREMENT THAT CLAIMS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE DESIGN
BE SUPPORTED BY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In spite of Horn and Cunningham, the majority view is still that the
state of the art must necessarily be one of the limits of a designer's duty.
This may suggest that the law has avoided doctrinaire extremism and once
more muddled through to a common sense solution. Unfortunately, there
is no cause for even such muted celebration.
The same judges who speak of the "state of the art" in terms of prac-
ticality, marketability and similar factors often undermine their own rea-
soning by permitting the plaintiff to "prove" his assertions concerning those
questions by a verbal ritual rather than by meaningful evidence."0 In a case
80 See, e.g., Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1967); Self v. General
Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
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like our hypothetical, the plaintiff's counsel asks his witness whether he
thinks that some technique or device was "within the state of the art" and
perhaps, if the lawyer is of a cautious or painstaking nature, whether the
expert believes that the "improvement" could have been produced at a
reasonable cost and would have been technically feasible at the time the
actual product was developed. To no one's surprise, the witness answers
"yes" to each question, sometimes adding confidently that it could have
been built for less than ten dollars (or twenty or a hundred).' The lawyer
then has the expert testify that it is his conclusion that the product fell
short of "acceptable design practices" or "reasonable engineering standards".
The witness does not explain how he knows any of this. Usually he
has never been responsible for producing such a product-improved or
unimproved-and he is "bootstrapping"; neither the government nor trade
groups nor academic writers have established any objective rules as to the
aspect of design in question and the "standards" to which he refers are his
own subjective views. More remarkable still, the witness may never have
tested the "improvement" he discusses so glibly. Thus the critical opinion
depends entirely upon the unexplained and subjective thinking of the
"expert" unsupported by tests or any other empirical evidence.
Moreover, the situation often is far more extreme-the expert may
well admit that most manufacturers do not use his technique or, for that
matter, that no manufacturer in the world ever has used it.6" In either case,
he pits his opinion, unsupported by tests or any objective standards, against
that of the majority of manufacturers and the engineers whom they employ
and, often, the unanimous opinion of every manufacturer in the industry
as well.
All too often, none of this matters as long as the witness and the lawyer
61 This type of testimony suggests that all that is involved is the cost of adding some "off-
the-shelf" item and, perhaps, an arbitrary percentage for overhead. In reality, as Professor
Henderson has pointed out, the change in one aspect of the vehicle often will involve a
whole train of additional modifications. Limits of Adjudication, supra note 1, at 1570-72.
The added cost in turn will affect marginal cost, average cost and the volume sales.
It would require a fairly elaborate treatise to explain the matter fully. For our purposes it
suffices to say that the matter of cost is a highly complex one and that the expert should not
be permitted to offer a dollar figure unless he has a basis for his calculations.
32 E.g., in Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), the
plaintiff's expert attacked the automobile industry's failure to use roll bars or roll cages in
its products. He admitted that no mass-produced automobile manufactured in the United
States had ever come equipped with such a design, and on a global level only West German
Porsche Targa used such a design in all its cars. Nonetheless, the plaintiff was allowed to
recover on this meager showing. See also Havlick v. Ford Motor Co., 351 So. 2d 1050, 1052
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Letts, J., dissenting), cert. denied, N. 52,096 (April 27, 1978)
(the plaintiff used foreign luxury cars to prove the state of the art for an American economy
car).
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have recited the litany. The jury is left to decide whether an expert made
his claims in good faith. If they choose, they are free to place some weight
upon the fact that the alternative device has never been tested, but they are
equally free to ignore it; the question has no particular significance as far as
many judges are concerned. In the balance of this paper, we will argue that
testing - or its absence - should matter a great deal.
Several commentators who share this general concern already have
argued that the law should be changed by statute. 3 We suggest, as an alter-
live, that the courts could make the requirements of proof more meaningful and
fair if they were to apply basic common law principles which already exist
or, at most, extend them slightly. They need merely require that a litigant
who wishes to have his expert testify that a technique is within the state of the
art first lay a foundation for that testimony,"4 by evidence of testing or some
comparable empirical proof that the proposed design actually would be
practical and effective. If the proponent does not satisfy that threshold re-
quirement, the testimony should be considered to be speculative as a matter
of law and, therefore, not admissible. 5
A. The Divergence Between Science and the Law
Unless he is a defense specialist, the odds are high that a lawyer will
react to the hypothetical we set forth earlier by saying that the plaintiff's
case may well be weakened by admission or gaps in the expert's reasoning,
6. Suggested legislative reforms include the proposal of the Defense Research Institute for
a uniform state of the art statute. See State of the Art-Post-Accident Modification-Industry
Standards, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 295, 297-98 (1977). See also Limits of Adjudication, supra
note 1, at 1574-77; Representational Theory, supra note 57, at 1378.
64 FED. R. EVID. 703, 705.
65 Absolute certainty is not required of an expert witness. See, e.g., Douglas v. Herringdine,
117 Ga. App. 72, 76, 159 S.E.2d 711, 715 (1967); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Provine, 321 So. 2d
311, 314 (Miss. 1975); Kenney v. J.A. Folger & Co., 192 S.W.2d 73, 78 (Mo. App. 1946).
However, no matter how skilled or experienced an expert witness may be, he will not be
permitted to guess. E.g., Kale v. Douthitt, 274 F.2d 476, 482 (4th Cir. 1960); Darling v.
Charleston Community Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 329-30, 200 N.E.2d 149, 187 (1964),
afl'd, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Harp v.
Ill. Cent. R. Co., 370 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. 1963); Wall v. Partridge, 466 P.2d 628,
629 (Okla. 1970). The expert also cannot state a judgment based on mere conjecture or
speculation. E.g., McFarland v. Gregory, 425 F.2d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 1970); D'Amico v.
Lloyd Brasileiro Patrinonic Nationale, 354 F.2d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1965); Arnold v. Loose,
352 F.2d 959, 963 (3d Cir. 1965); Jones v. Goodlove, 334 F.2d 90, 94 (8th Cir. 1964);
Alabama Power Co. v. Johnson, 281 Ala. 259, 263, 201 So. 2d 514, 519 (1967); Williams
v. Simpson, 209 So. 2d 262, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 629 (Fla.
1968); Boose v. Digate, 107 Ill. App. 2d 418, 422-23, 246 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1969); St. Clair
v. St. Clair, 211 Kan. 468, 492, 507 P.2d 206, 225 (1973); O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wash.
2d 814, 823, 440 P.2d 823, 829 (1968). Under Rules 702-705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the initial expert testimony would still be admissible but it would be stricken if direct
gnl iross-ixamination revealed the absence of a meaningful foundation.
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but those failings go merely to the weight of the evidence, not its admissi-
bility, so that the whole matter must be left to the wisdom of the jury.",
To an engineer or designer, however, it is a mockery to submit a com-
plex technical matter to a jury of laymen on the basis of an uncorroborated,
conclusory statement. To them, any inquiry into the state of the art begins
with the question of whether the proposed alternative actually does work.
If it does, it is at least a possible approach and the device later may prove
to satisfy the additional requirements of cost, marketability and the like. But
if the design does not work, that is the end of the matter. Similarly, it
seems obvious to those who lack the benefit of legal training that the best
way to learn whether a device works is to try it out - not to accept the
assurance of its inventor that it will work, no matter how fervent and sincere
he may be.
It follows that no responsible scientist could conceive of treating an
untested proposal as "within the state of the art" for any important purpose
- other than testimony under oath - simply because an individual favored
it, no matter how highly qualified he might be. Since Francis Bacon,
the scientific method has required that any hypothesis be tested and that the
results, in turn, be verified by other workers in the field before they can be
accepted as part of the relevant body of learning.67 Testing is the essence of
the process, not an afterthought to be used or dispensed with as a matter
of convenience.
B. Legal Precedent for the Requirement
The lawyer's assumption that a court must take a lenient approach to
expert testimony more often results from reverence for tradition or vague
recollection of case law than from careful analysis. Indeed, when one reads
them closely, even leading decisions in this area sometimes prove to mean
something significantly different from the propositions for which they are
routinely cited.
For instance, the principle that conformity to industry practice is not
66 See, e.g., Amador Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1962) (admission
by the expert that he may have been mistaken in his opinion did not render his testimony
inadmissible). See also Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976). The lawyer's
faith that the jurors can choose between conflicting experts on the basis of their demeanor
on the stand, of course, tends to baffle or amuse the scientist. The fact that one witness may
sweat or be unable to stare at the jury while he answers a question is wholly extraneous to
the technical issue.
6T R. BRIGGS, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 56-58 (1969);
N. BUTTERFIELD, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE 74-79 (1951); A. CROMBIE, ROBERT
GROSSETESTE AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE 300-03 (1953); W. DAM-
PrER-WrETHAM, A HISTORY OF SCINCE 74-79 (1951); J. REDWOOD, EUROPEAN SCIENCE IN
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 17-18 (1977).
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an absolute defense is seldom even questioned. But the classic precedent
for that proposition also suggests that the balance between the interests of
the plaintiff and the defendant in such a controversy requires an approach
much like the one we advocate. In The T. J. Hooper 8 Judge Learned Hand
said that:
A whole industry may unduly lag in the adoption of new and of avail-
able devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end show what is required; there are pre-
cautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse
their omission ....
On the other hand, he did not say that a case could go to a jury on no basis
other than the conclusory testimony of one witness contradicting the prevailing
opinion of experts in the field. The case, in fact, did not involve a jury or
present any state of the art issue at all.
The Hooper was a tug which took several barges to sea in 1928. Caught
in a storm, some of the barges sank. The Weather Bureau had broadcast
several warnings against the storm and several tugs which were equipped with
radios had put back into harbor. The cargo owners sued the line which
owned the Hooper, claiming that she also should have taken refuge. At trial,
her master testified that had he received the message, he would have turned
back. There was a radio on his vessel, but it was broken. The owners neither
supplied nor maintained it. Only one other tugboat line did furnish radios.
The other lines, like the defendant, apparently expected their crew to have
radios aboard, partly as personal equipment and partly for entertainment.
Judge Hand affirmed the trial judge's award of damages and approved
his ruling that the owner was not excused because other companies also
had not installed reliable radios. But there was no issue in the case concerning
the cost or feasibility of such equipment; on the contrary it apparently was
undisputed that by 1928 radio sets suitable for use by coastal tugs were avail-
able at small cost and reasonably reliable. Further, a point which is often for-
gotten, Judge Hand explicitly said that the defendant who does what its peers
also do normally will not be liable;"0 and his ruling against the Hooper's owners
resulted from the exceptional circumstance that there was clear-cut evidence
that the supposedly superior technology worked - the fact that other tugs
were using radios successfully and, in fact, had received the critical
storm warning.
68 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
69 Id. at 740.
10 Id.
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The defendant in our hypothesis could have little objection to the
principle which can be drawn from the case. Although the dangers of col-
lusion seem exaggerated, 1 it probably would not be wise to give any industry
the power to set its own standards. It is fair to permit the plaintiff to base his
case on the opinion of an individual expert even if the defendant has con-
formed to the practice in his industry-provided that opinion has a founda-
tion of empirical evidence.
A number of other cases offer more direct support for this suggestion.
To begin, acid comments about the quality of the testimony upon which
the plaintiff relied are commonplace in the product liability reports." True,
the same judge often goes on to affirm the verdict in spite of an obvious lack
of confidence in the expert---or even, on occasion, to create a new rule of
law in order to permit a plaintiff to recover in spite of his expert."3 But
some courts have held that the opinion of the plaintiff's expert was not
sufficient to support the verdict because he had failed to include statements
that the alternative design he favored was within the state of the art," or
technically feasible,7" or that it could be mass-produced at reasonable cost,7 1
or that it would have significantly reduced the risk of the accident in question. 7
Other decisions focus upon the general requirements for expert testi-
mony, emphasizing that the witness cannot speculate and that his testimony
can have no weight if it contradicts some physical fact or law of science.'
Some of these cases hold that the expert's conclusion can have no value
71 Presumably the vigilant "private attorneys general" of the plaintiffs' bar would attack any
unreasonable standard.
72 See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 736 (3d Cir. 1976); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Berwick Indus., 532 F.2d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 1976).
73 See Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., 113 N.J. Super. 279, 273 A.2d 606, affd, 59 N.J. 365,
283 A.2d 321 (1971).
71 See, e.g., Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971); Olson v. Arctic
Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205
So. 2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484
P.2d 47 (1971).
75 See, e.g., Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973); Schneider v.
Chrysler Motor Co., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968); Cardullo v. General Motors Corp., 378
F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1975); Garst v. General Motors
Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971); Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash.
2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
76 See, e.g., Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 949
(1975); Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977). But see Helicoid
Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
7 See, e.g., Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972); Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 351 A.2d 22 (1976).
78 See case cited note 17 supra.
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unless it is supported by a foundation of facts and coherent reasoning;' a
few come still closer to our point by suggesting strongly that testing is, or
should be, an essential prerequisite to the expert's right to testify under
certain circumstances.3 0 The Third Circuit, for instance, recently remanded
a "second collision" case and suggested that the trial court consider requiring
proof of testing in the re-trial. 1 Similarly, in Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc.,"2
the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a strict liability
action in which the plaintiff's expert had testified that it was his opinion that
a child would not have been injured if a small grain elevator had borne a
protective shield such as that he described. Although it recognized the princi-
ple that an entire industry could be negligent, the court held that possibility
to be irrelevant because the plaintiff had never tested or built the equipment
he described and the design the defendant had used was universal in its
industry.
The Wyoming Supreme Court also made it clear in Maxted v. Pacific
Car & Foundry Co. 3 that it was not satisfied with the expert's verbal assur-
ances that the "jettisoning" device he proposed for logging trailers was prac-
tical. The fact that he had prepared a model of the device, as well as extensive
drawings, did not fill the gap left by the absence of testing:
From our view of the record, to hold that the evidence here submitted
was proof of a standard of care or duty upon these manufacturers
would be to cast upon them a burden of clairvoyance which it is doubt-
ful . . . Nostradamus could meet. "'
Garst v. General Motors Corporation"5 may be the best example of a
holding that an expert's testimony was not sufficient to support a verdict even
though it did include a net conclusion and subsidiary propositions concerning
the state of the art. There an assistant professor of mechanical engineering,
studying for his Ph.D., testified that it was his opinion that the design of a
large construction scraper was defective because the brakes were not suffici-
ently shielded against mud and its steering system lacked "enough" hydraulic
power. A jury found in favor of the decedent's estate. One justice of the
79 A distinction must be made between a conclusion based upon "technological facts" and
mere "unctuous criticism." Morris, The Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of Negli-
gence Issues, 26 TEX L. REv. 1, 15 (1947).
.
80 See, e.g., Lash v. Noland, 321 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), where the court
relied on the tests performed on a golf-cart's brakes prior to trial.
81 Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976), but note that the tests apparently
would measure the performance of the actual design, not a proposed alternative.
so 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973).
83 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974).
84 Id. at 836.
11 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971).
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Kansas Supreme Court argued that the expert's criticisms of the design and
some company documents expressing reservations about the steering system
were sufficient to create a conflict of experts.8" The majority, however,
analyzed the testimony more closely. They found that the design used was
standard in the industry, that the witness had never tested the various
"improvements" which he proposed, that they had never been used in equip-
ment of the type in question, and that the testimony of the defense experts
showed that each such proposal had significant practical drawbacks. Ulti-
mately, the majority held that the fact that the expert thought the scraper
should have stopped or turned more quickly and that he believed a theoret-
ical design would have been an improvement was not a sufficient basis for
the jury's verdict; they set aside the award of $118,000."7
C. Some Practical Considerations
These cases show that our proposal is consistent with the basic principles
of evidence and of appellate review. We would be less than candid, how-
ever, if we did not concede that there is not yet any explicit requirement
in the prevailing case law that a plaintiff's expert test every alternative he
proposes. On the contrary, many courts tend to dismiss any attack upon the
adequacy of the evidence in a design controversy, simply assuming that an
expert's conclusion must be sufficient to create a jury issue regardless of what
he may have omitted or conceded during his testimony." The California
Supreme Court, hardly a conservative bastion, has warned that this general
tendency is so widespread that modern litigation is in danger of evolving back
86 Id. at 23-25, 484 P.2d at 63-64 (Fatzer, J., dissenting).
871d. at 23, 484 P.2d at 63. Also note that more than one case has subjected a manufacturer
to punitive damages because it did not conduct its "crash tests" or their equivalent. See Owen,
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MicH. L. REv. 1257, 1341 (1976),
citing Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 70-9255-L (93d Jud. Dist. Ct. Dallas County, Tex.,
Nov. 26, 1972), noted in 16 A. TRIAL LAW. AM. NEws LETTER 30 (1973). See also Sabbich
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976). It seems sur-
prising, then, that the courts seem to assume that the decision by the plaintiff's expert not
to conduct any tests has no legal significance at all. Surely that incongruity at least should
prevent recovery in the inevitable case in which a plaintiff, relying on the theory of an
expert who has conducted no tests of his own proposed design (or only a cautious and
perfunctory laboratory exercise) seeks punitive damages from a defendant on the theory
that it did not test its design thoroughly enough.
86 See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); Spurlion v. General
Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612, rehearing denied, 531 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976); Nanda v.
Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App.
3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
The Melia case is criticized in Note, Manufacturers' Liability for Design Defects, 56
NEB. L. REv. 422 (1977). The author points out that the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
a verdict on the basis of expert testimony that a door lock was "defective" even though there
was no testing of the alternative design and there was no evidence of the statistical likeli-
hood of the side-swiping impact which caused the door to open in the accident.
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into something akin to a "medieval trial by oath."89 Yet, while decisions of
the sort the court criticized are commonplace, they usually are dicta or wholly
unexplained fiat rather than carefully reasoned holdings. Nothing in the
basic nature of product liability doctrine, or that of appellate review, requires
such an approach. Indeed, without a requirement of foundational facts,
litigation simply is not likely to produce responsible answers to difficult
technical issues.
The expert's testimony concerning an alternate design usually is the
most important part of the plaintiffs case; millions of dollars may change
hands because of his claims, to say nothing of the damage to the reputation
of the manufacturer and its designers which follow an adverse verdict. Yet
neither the plaintiff's expert, the trial judge, the appellate judges nor any-
one else will ever know whether that alternative design actually would work
if it has not been tested. This is not the way serious business is done in the
world. Consider the different manner in which comparable questions
are treated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act.9" It is no secret that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
and the automobile companies sometimes differ over the proper procedures
for testing and the proper criteria for test equipment.9' But, in a broader
sense, the situation is at least comprehensible to an engineer or a businessman.
For better or worse, the government has set out, at least in certain instances,
to hold manufacturers to a particular level of performance by setting stand-
ards in advance, and it intends to impose sanctions if they fall short of that
level; it necessarily follows that the product must be tested in order to see
if it does meet those criteria. This might seem too obvious for comment were
it not the conventional assumption that there is no such requirement when
a private plaintiff seeks to recover from one of the same automobile com-
panies in a common law action.
D. The Partisan Critic and the Design Process
The assumption that no testing is necessary also ignores the unique
89 People v. Basset, 69 Cal. 2d 122, 140, 443 P.2d 777, 789, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193, 205 (1968).
The court warned in a criminal case that the trial could become a mere "swearing con-
test" between paid experts if the requirement of foundation facts eroded further and pointed
out that "[t]he chief value of an expert's testimony... rests upon the material from which
his opinion is fashioned and the reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his
conclusion; . . . . it does not lie in his mere expression of conclusion." Id. at 141, 443
P.2d at 789, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (quoting Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617
(D.C. Cir. 1957)).
.90 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Note section 1395 requires the Secretary
to conduct testing to carry out the purposes of the Act.
91 See Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972). See also Pac-
car, Inc. v. N.H.T.S.A., No. 75-1017 (9th Cir. April 17, 1978) (holding N.H.T.S.A. truck
brake standard invalid for lack of thorough testing).
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power of the technical expert in a product law suit and the temptations that
power can create. In relatively recent years, a whole new occupation has
developed: the witness for hire. The back pages of bar association journals
usually list a variety of "consultants" who are available to testify in prod-
uct liability cases anywhere in the country for a fee. One critic of the
automobile industry, in fact, recently ran a large advertisement in a legal
newspaper 12 inviting one and all to attend a "special nite" [sic] for lawyers and
legal secretaries at Tiffany's, "California's most exciting private club." He
was giving the party, the text explained, so that he, a "top expert witness",
could show "how to win" and "how to expand 'accident' cases into 'product
liability' cases." Complimentary hors d'oeuvres were to be served at eight
followed by a "products liability rap session" and "car crash test movie from
nine to ten". There would then be "mixing, libations and dancing until 2:00
a.m. - no admission charge."
Sponsoring a cabaret may be the entrepreneurial spirit at its best, but
it is not the action of the traditional disinterested fact witness. On the other
hand, the attempt to generate business is not surprising or even unusual save
for its comic directness. A plaintiff's lawyer, of course, might say that the
stork does not bring the expert defense witness either. That is true, but
beside the point. Defense experts vary in terms of skill and character just
as do plaintiffs' experts;9" the principle is the same. The hired witness long ago
evolved into a professional, no doubt limited by scientific ethics as to some of
the things he can or will say, but still a person whose livelihood, like that of
the lawyer, depends upon his prowess in advocating the cause of the person
who pays him.
Lawyers and judges, of course, know this, but jurors often do not.
In the melodrama which the plaintiff's lawyer presents at trial, the outside
expert is the hero. Chosen in part for his appearance and speaking ability
and presented as more intelligent or more "safety conscious" than those who
work in the industry, he usually describes some approach which is beguiling
in its simplicity. In some instances, he actually may have superior insight.
But more often, he merely talks about general considerations which are ob-
vious to designers. Furthermore, the defendant may not have adopted the ap-
92 Los Angeles J., Jan. 19, 1976, at 20.
93 The standard we propose would apply to a defense expert as well as to a plaintiff's expert.
It would be a less significant restraint upon the defense expert, however. As we have seen,
the plaintiff's witness is often thought to be at liberty to speak in terms of hypothetical "im-
proved design" which has never been used. The defense expert, instead, must discuss a
design which has been worked out in full, embodied in a prototype, tested, mass-produced
and subjected to usage under actual conditions and by a large number of actual consumers.
This imposes a natural discipline. The fact that the plaintiff's expert is not subject to the
same discipline is the main reason a requirement of testing is needed.
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proach he suggests for any of a number of valid reasons: the concept may have
been tried and found wanting by the defendant or other manufacturers; or it
may not be suited to the characteristics of the defendant's particular product;
or it may be that no one has ever proved the existence of the advantage
which the expert claims. The process by which an automobile or any other
consumer product is designed, after all, is not like a geometry problem or
anything else which can be dealt with satisfactorily on the level of pure
abstraction. It is, instead, an intensely pragmatic matter. In theory, a novel
design approach may be entirely appropriate but when it is put to the test
of actual usage, it may be plagued with unforeseen problems of cost, suit-
ability for mass production or even safety. 4 As a result, it-is not at all difficult
for a "consultant" to propose some approach which may seem plausible
and to cut a figure before the jury. But outside the special world of product
litigation, he will not accomplish anything by such soliloquies. Until he
builds the device and subjects it to testing under a reasonably representative
range of circumstances, he and every person active in the field will know that
he is speculating and nothing more.
The individual expert, of course, cannot be criticized if he decides to
avoid testing his proposal. As long as the law permits the case to go to
the jury on the basis of his abstract theory, he would be derelict in his duty
to the lawyer who hires him and the client who pays him if he needlessly
ran that risk. If his approach did work, that fact would add nothing to his
theory; if it did not work, his theory would be destroyed.
E. Barriers to Self-Delense
Given the importance of empirical testing, one might ask why the
manufacturer does not conduct the tests itself in order to dispel the mis-
leading impression. One answer is that the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof,9 5 and he should have to conduct the tests rather than leave it to the
manufacturer to attempt to disprove some novel hypothesis. But even
if the manufacturer wishes to assume this burden as a matter of self-
defense, the dynamics of the trial often would hamper his efforts. The plaintiff
94 See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
95 The tendency to speak of a "state of the art" defense may mislead some into thinking that
the question is one of an affirmative defense. Occasionally it is, but far more often the
issues are part of the plaintiff's case. The products liability plaintiff, much as any other
plaintiff, must prove certain facts in order to establish a prima facie case, and also to satisfy
the overall burden of persuasion which he or she bears when and if the case reaches the
jury. See generally Nicklaus v. Hughes Tool Co., 417 F.2d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 1969). Several
cases have expressly placed the burden concerning state of the art issues on the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974); Cardullo v. General
Motors Corp., 378 F. Supp. 890, 893-94 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 511 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir.
1975); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 715, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748 (1976).
See generally Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
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presents his case first, and many judges permit him a great deal of flexibility.
The defendant, on the other hand, necessarily must react to whatever charges
the plaintiff chooses to bring against it during the trial - charges which are
often significantly different from those which were advanced even at late
stages of discovery. As a result, any tests the defendant might conduct in
reliance upon what it had been told in interrogatories, depositions or even
the pre-trial conference might well be outdated by the time of the trial. 6 In
addition, the "improved" approach is often too speculative and ill-defined
for anyone to test, let alone someone who has just heard of it. For these rea-
sons, self help is not a fair substitute for the protection the law should give.
Moreover, the tradition of judicial lenience to the plaintiff's expert
has a corollary. In practice if not in theory, many courts seem to impose an
unduly restrictive standard when the defendant offers a test." That insistence
upon excellence would be admirable were it consistent. Unfortunately, it
is not, and as a result the situation frequently degenerates into absurdity.
The plaintiff, of course, is correct when he says that the defendant's test
does not reproduce every aspect of the actual accident or, when an advance
in the state of the art is at issue, that the test does not duplicate every danger
to which the new design might be subjected in actual usage. No test is
perfect. The process necessarily is selective, and the court must make a judg-
ment in each instance, just as the scientist must. However, even an imperfect
test usually is better than no test.
Unfortunately, some courts seem to have lost sight of that simple pro-
position. Often, the trial judge accepts the argument that minor discrepancies
in testing procedures are important enough to exclude the defendant's tests,
supposedly in the interest of scientific accuracy. Yet the net result is that
the jury hears about the plaintiff's hypothetical alternative design, does not
receive the benefit of any evidence whatsoever concerning tests, and is left to
guess whether or not the device works at all.
96 Some judges do protect the defendant against late changes in theory, but others do not.
We speak of what often happens in practice, not what would happen if the rules always were
enforced.
9 Many defense lawyers believe that judges reject tests offered by the defense which they
would permit if offered by a plaintiff. This, of course, is an impression only, supported by
cases such as Pohlod v. General Motors Corp., 40 Mich. App. 583, 199 N.W.2d 277 (1972),
but not by any systematic survey. On the other hand, it is more than "sour grapes" or a
belief that judges are "plaintiff-oriented." A judge who was entirely fair-minded may still
give the plaintiff greater leeway, believing that the defense has greater knowledge and re-
sources and, therefore, is in a better position to demonstrate the weaknesses in the plaintiff's
test by cross-examination, while the plaintiff would not be able to do the same to a defense test. In
reality, however, the plaintiff's lawyer often has resources available to him as great or greater
than those available to the defense counsel. Moreover, the basic idea that a plaintiff's
counsel should be entitled to some form of advantage may be outdated.
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F. Some Arguments Against a Requirement of Testing
Many of the arguments which might be offered against the requirement
of an empirical foundation do not seem overwhelming. To begin, the
courts simply might not believe that any test of a proposed design could be
sufficiently reliable to be useful- by analogy to the traditional attitude
toward lie detectors.9" Clearly, however, this is not the situation. Plaintiffs
often base their cases against manufacturers on the results of tests, either
those the defendant has conducted itself during the design process or their
own. Thus there is a considerable body of law concerning the requirements
for testing, and no one seems to suggest that the matter is beyond the capacity
of courts and juries.
There also is no reason to believe that the jury's opportunity to assess
the demeanor of a witness eliminates the need for this evidence. The question
is not whether one expert or the other is lying - a matter of the type which
the law traditionally does entrust to jurors' intuitive reactions. 9 It is, instead,
whether a particular approach to the design of a complex mechanical device
will work significantly better than another approach. The expert, like any
other advocate, may well believe what he is saying while saying it, but the
fact remains that no one will know whether he is right unless his proposal
is put to the test.
The question of practicality is more difficult. If there were no way
to provide the jurors with evidence on the question of whether the alternative
device did or did not work, the unsupported opinion which is now fashion-
able might have to suffice. But in fact, the courts could obtain that evidence
if they chose to do so. Almost every such claim can either be verified or put
to rest by some form of testing or other empirical evidence. Indeed, it would
seem that an assertion which could not be tested would be speculative by
definition. Yet it would not be reasonable to require individual plaintiffs and
their lawyers to match the testing programs which manufacturers conduct. In
theory, this is precisely what they should have to do if they claim to have
superior competence in the design and manufacture of consumer goods, but
the financial burden presumably would be prohibitive except in some class
actions. Fairness, then, requires some compromise.
The task is substantial, but the general outline of a solution seems
plain enough. If a plaintiff's counsel believes that full scale testing of the
alternative design would be unreasonably expensive or impractical for some
other reason, he or she should have to satisfy the trial judge of that fact by
9 8 Gideon v. Gideon, 153 Cal. App. 2d 541, 546-47, 341 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 902 (1958).
99 See, e.g., Creekmore v. Crossno, 259 F.2d 697, 698 (10th Cir. 1958); Knapp v. Arizona
Highway Dep't., 56 Ariz. 54, 57, 104 P.2d 180, 181 (1940).
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an argument based on the specific circumstances of his case;10' he should be
obligated to offer some alternative in lieu of that evidence. One such alter-
native might be a program of limited testing carefully designed to explore
the characteristics of the product which are significant in the individual law-
suit. If even this were impractical, he might resort to a showing that
the design already is in use by others in the industry, a technique which has
been a part of the lawyer's repertoire for years. Or, if the device had not
been tried in the industry, the plaintiff might be able to persuade a court
that it had been used in some field which was legitimately comparable.
Finally, counsel could also try to elicit admissions from defense witnesses,
the technique so successful in the Horn case.
In any event, much of the burden of the effort would not fall upon the
widow or orphan, or even the consumer advocate. Most design cases are
brought by sophisticated lawyers, for contingent fees which range between
thirty and fifty percent of the total recovery. These are high stakes and they
already have led to the development of the professional witness with his
"independent testing laboratory" and to the growth of clearing houses
through which plaintiff's lawyers who have similar cases exchange documents
and other information. This suggests that the plaintiffs' bar would continue
to be as active under the new regime as it was under the old, simply because
it has a powerful economic incentive.
V. CONTINUING REVOLUTION - OR ORTHODOXY?
Many judges, of course, are conscious of the reasons why a plaintiff
should have to provide a factual foundation for his expert's claims; but they
ignore them, believing that the nature of product liability law requires that
the plaintiff be allowed to succeed with evidence of far lower quality than
that which would be required in other areas of law.1"'
That idea, stated or unstated, is often the basic premise from which
a court proceeds to analyze any new issue. Indeed, it is one of the paradoxes
of product liability law that courts which proudly and correctly believe them-
selves to be in the vanguard of change often offer little or no reason for
those changes except this traditional, unexamined preconception. For example,
the California Supreme Court recently pointed out in Barker v. Lull Engi-
neering Corp. " °' that a manufacturer is an expert in its own field almost by
100 In assessing such arguments, of course, the court should keep in mind the approach it
would take if the positions were reversed and the manufacturer were attempting to defend
itself against an accusation of defective design by suggesting that it was excused from any
responsibility to test the new device because of delay or expense.
101 One exception might be worker's compensation. Note that while the standards of proof
in the compensation field are reduced, the amounts which the plaintiff can recover also are
limited.
102 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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definition.'"' That fact, however, counted against the defendant; the court
proceeded to reason that since the manufacturer knew far more about its
product than the plaintiff, it should have to prove that the design was not
defective."' The court offered no further explanation as to why it was over-
ruling a thousand years or so of precedent that it is the plaintiff who bears
the burden of proof -other than to add, almost as an aside, that the
change would reduce the "onerous burden a plaintiff faces in a design case."'0 5
So it would. But is not the real question whether the further
reduction of the plaintiff's burden should be an end in itself? When
earlier cases such as Escola v. Coca Cola'01  and Henningsen v
Bloomfield Motors"" began to reduce the qualitative standard of
proof, plaintiffs probably did find it difficult to prove just how a manufacturer
had erred even when it was clear that the product had not performed its
function safely. The small amounts at stake logically would have imposed
limits on their trial preparation and, even though it was never proved, the
fact that most engineers and scientists worked for corporations may have
had an effect similar to the "conspiracy of silence" which the victims of
medical malpractice are said to face. But at some stage in the development
of every legal doctrine, the pendulum swings too far. We suggest that pro-
duct litigation has reached that point. The once revolutionary frame of mind
which led courts to cut through privity and other artificial and traditional
barriers has become rigid orthodoxy; and the reasoning which it produced
is no longer realistic.
The case of an exploding Coca Cola bottle or a new car which swerves
off the road is far less complex than many design cases in which the "failure",
if any, is attenuated and debatable. 0 8 Furthermore, as the decades have
passed, the plaintiffs' bar has grown in sophistication and power and an
entirely new profession - the itinerant technical witness - has developed.
At the same time, the amount of money at stake in product cases has grown
exponentially. Thus the claimant and his lawyer now have every opportunity
to prepare and try their case as thoroughly as any other litigant and they
can expect hundreds of thousands of dollars, if not millions, when they suc-
103 Id. at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. See also Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 13
(8th Cir. 1964); Pipe Welding Supply Co. v. Gas Atmospheres, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 191, 200
(N.D. Ohio 1961); Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 133, 145, 237 N.E.2d
759, 765 (1968); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (1976).
104 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
105 Id. at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
1O 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
107 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
308 For an historical analysis of the process of attenuation, see Epstein, supra note 7, at 650-53.
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ceed. By the same token, the dramatic growth of the verdict casts doubt on
the assumption that such an award can be passed on as a routine cost of
business.1°9 The evidence is mounting that this type of litigation is changing
the relationship between companies and their insurers and that the specter
of million dollar judgments accompanied by virtually unlimited punitive
damage awards will increase that distortion. 10
In short, every tide must turn. The time has come for reconsideration,
at the least, of the relatively limited question of the foundation for an expert's
conclusion as to the state of the art. The suggestion may be inconsistent with
the prevailing dogma. But if so, that would seem to call for reassessment of the
broader question of evidentiary standards in product litigation rather than
the casual dismissal of the proposal for reform.
To a lawyer, the suggestion that an expert witness should have to lay
a foundation of empirical evidence if he asserts that an alternative design
is within the state of the art may seem novel. Yet to the engineer it is
a pathetically tentative first step. The proposal is not that judges or jurors ab-
dicate their roles in favor of arbitrators who are themselves skilled designers
or that there be any other fundamental change in the nature of the trial.
We ask only that the courts adopt the bare rudiments of the scientific method,
if they feel it their duty to attempt to decide scientific and technical contro-
versies, and that partisan experts be held to the standards of scientists if they
are to be treated as scientists.
The specific evidentiary requirement would be a modest one. Many
plaintiffs already meet that standard, and others could satisfy if by a number
of means. As we ourselves have argued, results in practice sometimes are
different from those which the theoretician projects. We would not expect
the change to stop the growth of product litigation or even to deter any
but the marginal lawsuit. It would be, however, a simple but significant step
toward making the trial of a state of the art issue a meaningful inquiry
rather than what it often is now, a mere ritual which a "trial-wise" pro-
fessional witness can defeat with contemptuous ease.
109 The "spreading the loss" rationale seems inconsistent with the assumption that the standards
of proof should be low in product litigation. Arguendo, it may be proper for the loss to be
included as a cost of business, but that is only so when the business has caused the loss. If
the plaintiff has caused the loss himself, permitting him to recover by winking at scanty
evidence decreases his incentive to behave carefully and subjects the manufacturer to an
unfair burden. That risk is multiplied when several defendants are involved, i.e., a manu-
facturer and one or more suppliers. If the standard of evidence is reduced, the cost resulting
from the injury may well be assigned to one or the other manufacturer, but it will come
to rest on a speculative or oven random basis so that the expense may be added to the price
of the wrong product. For a more extended critique of the "spreading of the loss," see
Epstein, supra note 7, at 659-61.
10 See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILrrY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE FINAL
REPORT ON INSURANCE STUDY, (1977).
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